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ABSTRACT
Digital apps using Bluetooth to log proximity events 
(henceforth, digital contact tracing) are increasingly 
supported by technologists and governments. By and 
large, the public debate on this matter focuses on 
privacy, with experts from both law and technology 
offering very concrete proposals and participating to 
a lively debate. Far less attention is paid to effective 
incentives and their fairness. This paper aims to fill this 
gap by offering a practical, workable solution for a 
promising incentive, justified by the ethical principles of 
non- maleficence, beneficence, autonomy and justice. This 
incentive is a free phone optimised for running such app.
INTRODUCTION
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has 
spread to all continents, contributing to more than 
ten millions of confirmed cases and a huge amount 
of deaths in just over 5 months. Governments and 
health agencies around the world are working 
together to find solutions to the COVID-19 
pandemic, to save lives and to reinvigorate society.
The measures taken to prevent and slow down 
the spread of the disease include contact tracing, 
testing and isolation (in some cases involving the 
prolonged lock- down of entire countries). One goal 
of governments and health agencies is to enhance 
the capacity to prevent disease transmission, by 
tracing and testing, thus reducing the need for the 
lock- down of entire cities, regions or countries. 
Health experts and researchers from diverse fields 
researching disease transmission, including virology, 
data science and social science, have highlighted the 
broad variety of information that can be collected, 
analysed and collected. Some East Asian countries, 
for example, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, 
have been employing a variety of electronic means 
to enable contact tracing, such as a public database 
of known patients, tracking phone location data for 
anyone under quarantine and tracking when users 
have been in close proximity via the Bluetooth in 
their phones.1
Digital apps using Bluetooth to log proximity 
events (henceforth, digital contact tracing) are 
increasingly supported by technologists2–4 and 
governments.5–8 By and large, the public debate 
on this matter focuses on privacy risks, with 
experts from both law and technology offering 
very concrete proposals to mitigate such risk, 
which is leading to a lively academic and public 
debate.5 6 9–14 Far less attention is paid to the ques-
tions of incentives and whether it is possible to have 
incentives that would be effective and ethical as 
well. Emerging ethical guideline proposals mention 
the problem of incentives and access equality15 and 
digital inequality more broadly.16 But no concrete 
proposal is currently being discussed. This paper 
aims to fill this gap by offering a practical, workable 
solution for an incentive that is plausibly effective 
(section 3) and ethically defensible (section 4). The 
ethical case for this is built on the ethical princi-
ples of non- maleficence, beneficence, autonomy 
and justice. We start the paper (sections 1 and 2) 
by briefly presenting the idea of privacy- sensitive 
contact tracing and the problem of incentives.
Case for privacy-sensitive contact tracing
This paper focuses on one specific class of digital 
tools against COVID-19, ‘proximity tracing tools’,16 
designed to enhance the capacity for contact tracing 
of public health surveillance systems. The Singapore 
app, for example, allows the Ministry of Health to 
determine the first- degree contacts of anyone logged 
by Bluetooth to be near them, which enhances the 
capacities of human contact tracers to follow up 
on those contacts with appropriate measures.11 In 
parallel, Apple and Google have enabled a decen-
tralised contact tracing capacity on their phones, 
which will enable a more efficient logging of nearby 
contacts by using the Bluetooth technology on iOS 
and Android phones.17 Proximity tracing tools 
should be distinguished from other types of digital 
tracing tools, in particular symptom checkers, 
quarantine compliance tools and flow modelling 
tools.16 18
One reason for the focus in this paper is that 
digital proximity tracing tools are seen as especially 
valuable complements to analogue contact tracing. 
Manual contact tracing does not scale easily,19 it is 
slow (an estimated average time of 12 hours to trace 
the contacts of a single infected individual),13 subject 
to memory gaps and is arguably more privacy inva-
sive, as connections between reported and suspected 
cases shall be made clear to health officials. Yet this 
interference with privacy is widely regarded as 
justified20 because contact tracing advances public 
health goals, facilitating a step- by- step return to an 
open society and economy. This can only happen 
if health systems are not overwhelmed, as seen, for 
example, in the Italian region of Lombardy.21 This 
requires effective containment of the disease. While 
digital contact tracing also impinges on privacy by 
requiring some kind of access to health status and 
behaviour, the privacy risks vary depending on the 
data types and protocols used by such tools.
It has been argued that Bluetooth proximity 
tracing in particular can be achieved collecting a 
minimal amount of data. Consider for example the 
TraceTogether app in Singapore: tracing works by 
producing ephemeral tokens (time- varying random 
strings) that are exchanged between different 
devices when these remain sufficiently near for a 
sufficient length of time. A proximity event is thus 
registered through such Bluetooth ‘handshakes’. 
When an individual is diagnosed with COVID-19, 
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all pseudonymised tokens in a defined time period (eg, 14 
days) are released and made public by an authority—typically a 
government server. Since the tokens are pseudonymous, the app 
user has no way to identify whom the tokens stored in their app 
belong to. But when a list of tokens is made public, the authority 
has a way to send alerts to the people who have been in close 
proximity to it.
Notice that there are at least two very different ways of doing 
this: the Singapore app is referred to as centralised because each 
phone sends a list of all the tokens of other phones with which it 
has shaken hands. When one person is reported as infected, the 
authority is able to contact the owners of other phones directly. 
This approach relies on trust in the government authority to 
respect the privacy of individuals.1 By contrast, in decentralised 
approaches, the phone of the infected individual does not share 
with the authority the tokens of all its handshakes. Rather, it 
uploads only the list of the tokens it has generated and let the 
apps in other phones check whether a handshake has taken place. 
The central authority has no way to reach or communicate with 
the proximate, not yet clinically tested, individuals, for it holds 
no data, not even pseudonymised ephemeral tokens, gener-
ated by their devices. This is roughly speaking the difference 
between the two approaches.19i In this paper, this contentious 
issue is sidestepped completely. Notice that, in both approaches, 
only pseudonymised ephemeral tokens are uploaded in central 
servers.
It has to be highlighted that while Bluetooth tools do not 
record position data (mitigating location- based group stig-
matisation, eg, based on place of worship), all contact tracing 
protocols threaten privacy to a certain extent. The decentralised 
approach shares at least part of the social graph around an 
infected individual with authorities, empowering sufficiently 
motivated government officials and hackers to de- anonymise 
these data. Even in decentralised approaches, sufficiently moti-
vated attackers (including state officials) can perform re- identifi-
cation attacks on high- value individuals, groups or geographical 
areas22 (arguably, however, such attacks are not likely to scale to 
the level of mass surveillance). The likelihood of such scenarios 
is highly debated in the expert community.23 In what follows, we 
shall assume that risks for privacy are low in both cases, at least 
if additional social and legal safeguards are in place. Examples of 
such safeguards are human rights laws, an independent judiciary, 
laws protecting journalists and whistleblowers, sunset clauses 
and laws mitigating the risk of forced choice, for example, 
punishing individuals in a position of power if they demand the 
installation of the apps by people subjected to it.ii
Summing up, digital contact tracing is seen as a more effi-
cient24 and (at least in the Bluetooth implementation) more 
privacy- preserving alternative than any existing alternative for 
contact tracing. In the light of this, it is not surprising to see 
that many government- backed and independent initiatives such 
as NHSX, PEPP- PD, DP- 3T and ROBERT have started defining 
technological standards to realise a Bluetooth solution enabling 
digital contact tracing.iii While perfect security and privacy 
i Roughly speaking, because one can distinguish two types of 
centralised approaches: one in which only the infected person 
uploads its list of contacts, and one in which all do. This differ-
ence between the former centralised protocol and the decen-
tralised one is the difference between protocol 2 and protocol 
3 in.30 The Apple/Google protocol follows the decentralised 
approach.17
ii Example of such legal provisions are found in.6 12
iii See31 for a fuller list. Notice that not all initiatives worldwide 
are not achievable, many people can consider such apps to 
provide acceptable protections, and this can be regarded entirely 
reasonable.
Voluntariness and incentives
Let us assume that the app guarantees to most people a sufficient 
degree of privacy protection given its purpose. In order to fulfil 
its public health use, any such app should be used by a consider-
able proportion of the population.iv In spite of that, most coun-
tries have decided that the app should be adopted voluntarily. In 
Singapore, one of the most technologically advanced and richest 
nations in the world, only about 17% of the population down-
loaded the app.25 Thus, it is plausible to think that a voluntary 
app needs, beside strong privacy and security guarantees, some 
kind of incentive in order to be adopted. As noted by Floridi,26 
many incentives generate unfairness. If you attach a benefit to 
having or using the app (eg, you must have the app to enter 
public buildings and transportation), you confer a benefit to that 
segment of the population who owns and can use smartphones 
already. Even in Europe, one of the richest, most highly educated 
and technologically advanced areas of the world, significant 
inequalities in digital skills exist and 17% of the population has 
no digital skills (defined as people who do not use the internet 
or only seldomly do so).27 So, incentives of that type raise issues 
of fairness and social justice.v
Proposal of fair incentives
This proposal is to incentivise the app by fully subsidising a 
smartphone with the preinstalled digital tracing app, requiring a 
single click to activate it, after completing the informed consent 
procedure (which should also be possible with a human operator, 
by phone). The phone should be optimised for use by the indi-
viduals with no digital skills. High usability is required to miti-
gate, to the greatest possible extent, difficulties due to the lack 
of digital skills of the user. This would require careful design and 
empirical testing. Conceivably, optimising usability for people 
lacking digital skills may lead to sacrificing most smart functions 
beside phone calls and running the contact tracing app in the 
background. (Visually, such device may end up looking like a 
replica of some early 2000s phone.) The phone should perhaps 
have a very clear indication of its additional (smart) function, 
which distinguishes from other older- looking phones; for 
example, it must be branded ‘digital tracing Covid’ and be easily 
recognisable as such. There are two reasons for this: to make 
sure that the user is aware that the phone provided for free is not 
just any ordinary phone, and to signal this to others. The ability 
to signal tracing to others is a safeguard for the user in a scenario 
are considering Bluetooth, eg, MIT Safe Paths uses GPS.
iv 60% adoption rate has been widely discussed as an estimate. 
The figure is a gross oversimplication of the model presented 
in.24 To see why, consider that the model includes several 
assumptions about disease transmission and a chance in such 
assumptions—that are far from certain—implies a change in this 
estimate.
v There are other objections against incentives, beside fairness. 
For example, linking the possibility to enter the metro or go to 
certain places to a notification of being ‘free from contagion’ 
generates an incentive for the individual not to carry their phone 
whenever they can avoid it, which compromises data quality. 
When return to social life is conditioned on using the app, there 
will be also a problem in the legal grounds of data processing 
since “consent given to the processing of data acquired via the 
mechanisms described so far could not be regarded as valid if it 
were framed as a precondition, for instance, to obtain certain 
services or goods—as was the case in China”.32
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in which digitally competent individuals exclude or stigmatise 
non- app- users and citizens using old phones are simply assumed 
to be non- app users. Immediately after the first initialisation of 
the operating system, the user should be asked to provide his 
or her informed consent to using the (already installed) contact 
tracing app. The informed consent form should explain the 
function of the digital contact tracing app, data processing and 
economic conditions in the simplest possible way. The user must 
have a clear opportunity to decline consent, but, in that case, 
a procedure will be activated, which will imply the restitution 
of the subsidy received by the state to obtain the phone. This is 
needed to prevent an inefficient use of state funds: the phone is 
for the people who are at least initially motivated to contribute 
to contact tracing. One month after the activation, the user 
should be free to uninstall the app phone without any financial 
penalty and should be made aware of this opportunity (this will 
be justified when discussing the value of autonomy).
Ethical assessment of the proposal
In this section, it is shown that the proposal is ethically justified, 
appealing to the bioethical principles of non- maleficience, benef-
icence, autonomy and justice.
Non-maleficence
The proposal is ethically justified by non- maleficence, a fortiori, 
by the same arguments that make a compulsory app prima facie 
ethically justified by non- maleficence.28 When a person has the 
possibility to mitigate serious risks to others, at little cost for 
him or herself, she is arguably morally required to do that. A 
person who is potentially contagious puts the lives and health of 
people near her at risk. A person who has no information about 
her past proximity to infected individuals also poses a significant 
risk to others, as the spread of the disease through asymptomatic 
individuals has shown. This risk can be reduced by using the 
app and self- isolating when one receives a notification of a prox-
imity event. Compared with the threat posed to public health, 
the burden for the user of the app is small, if a clinical test (eg, 
swab tests) is offered swiftly to the person receiving the notifica-
tion (to exclude a false positive) and other measures (eg, health 
insurance and unemployment benefits, covering absence from or 
inability to work) are in place.
From the point of view of non- maleficence, a voluntary app 
endorsed by a large proportion of the population (eg, 60%) is 
preferable to one that is compulsory, even if the latter is used 
more widely. The compulsory use of a portable device is either 
poorly enforced or enforced in a way that only an authoritarian 
regime would be willing to implement. A voluntary app is also 
fail- safe against government abuse and a higher- than- expected 
frequency of hacker attacks: if privacy violations and data misuse 
scandals emerge, a critical citizen may simply uninstall the app 
or stop using the COVID-19 phone.
Beneficence
The incentive proposal is prima facie justified from the point of 
view of beneficence since it pursues a public health purpose of 
primary importance. Public health encompasses the absence of 
disease and all the benefits deriving from the fact that individuals 
can return to a normal life and avoid conditions of economic 
deprivation. Beneficence only supports effective digital contact 
tracing, and an incentive system is a means to achieve wide-
spread voluntary adoption, which makes digital contact tracing 
effective. The proposal is arguably a good incentive since people 
are generally attracted to free gadgets. The scheme is relatively 
efficient because prospective free riders are at least induced to 
use the app for 1 month, and possibly sceptical or prejudged 
users are initially attracted to use it (by the selfish motivation to 
obtain a free phone) and given enough time to reflect carefully 
before uninstalling the app.
Autonomy
Nobody is obliged to use the smartphone, so user autonomy 
is respected. If coercive social norms to use such apps emerge, 
these phones can even be used—after 1 month—to mislead the 
observers about one’s user status and avoid social pressures: 
people may use a ‘fight COVID’ branded phone after unin-
stalling the app. Users who change their minds about the risks 
of digital contact tracing can simply uninstall the app (without 
penalties after the first month) or purchase a new phone. It may 
be objected that offering a phone for free amounts to a coercive 
offer.29 But an elementary phone, optimised for ease of use by 
unsophisticated users, with a branding associated with COVID-
19, that everyone can get for free, does not have a very high use 
value, market value or status symbol value (eg, compared with a 
high- end phone). While the phone is meant to be attractive, it is 
certainly not so attractive to be considered ‘an offer one cannot 
refuse’.
Justice
Unlike incentives directed to people who already possess and 
can use a smartphone, this incentive is especially fair. The phone 
should be optimised to promote acceptance and usability by 
those citizens who currently do not use internet- capable phones 
or do not use their phones to access the internet (even when their 
phones are internet capable). The difficulties associated with the 
lack of digital skills may be more cognitive and generational than 
economic. A phone optimised in this way is unlikely to attract 
people with high digital skills. The subsidy provided by the rest 
of society naturally reaches the group that is worst off in the 
most relevant sense, in this context. This type of self- selection is 
preferable to means testing because it avoids bureaucratic fric-
tions and also because the most relevant needs derive from a lack 
of digital competences, not a lack of purchasing power. (Many 
individuals otherwise excluded from contact tracing, namely 
older people, may not be among the poorest in society in wealth 
terms, eg, they may own a house.) The phone would be no status 
symbol or high- tech gadget benefiting the already well off.
CONCLUSION
Digital contact tracing apps with low adoption rates have little 
value for public health and their users because they are ineffec-
tive. One risk is that such apps will never be used by a segment 
of the population lacking digital skills. Some potentially effective 
incentives to use digital tracing apps are unfair, coercive and do 
not favour the inclusion of this group. Here, we offer a potential 
solution: a psychological and economic incentive (a free phone) 
that is neither coercive nor unfair.
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